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The finance literature has a long history of analyzing corporate bankruptcy. This 
includes development of bankruptcy prediction models, assessment of bankruptcy costs, 
and analysis of the association between bankruptcy and macroeconomic conditions. 
While many bankruptcy studies cover a large set of accounting- and finance-based data, 
no study has examined directly the influence of technology competition on bankruptcy. 
In this paper, we argue and find that the ongoing technology progress of firms contains 
important information with respect to the risk, costs, and pattern of bankruptcy.  
As technology rapidly advances, firms have to operate in highly competitive 
environments full of gradual and radical innovations. These scenarios provide firms with 
an opportunity to become market leaders if they develop the most recent, updated, and 
well-adopted technologies. Yet, they also involve non-trivial operational risk if the firms 
lose in the technology race. That is, firms outperformed by their competitors in 
technology-intensive industries typically find it challenging to catch up, which could lead 
to a substantial bankruptcy risk.1   
The patent system makes the relation between technology competition and 
bankruptcy even more direct. A patent assignee firm can sue competitors for 
infringement of its patents. Litigation may prohibit the defendant from performing any 
activities potentially related to that infringement. Should a court grant the plaintiff firm’s 
request of injunction, some operations of the defendant could be shut down. This 
enforcement can result in severe financial distress for the defendant firm (see, e.g., 
Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001). Moreover, all other explicit and implicit costs arising in the 
                                                 
1 A recent article in the Wall Street Journal observes: “Wary of emerging from the recession with obsolete 
products, big U.S. companies spent nearly as much on research and development in the dismal last quarter 
of 2008 as they did a year earlier,… Big R&D spenders say they’ve learned from past downturns that they 
must invest through tough times if they hope to compete when the economy improves” (Scheck and Glader, 
April 6, 2009).  
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patent litigation process can seriously deteriorate the financial status of the defendant (see 
Lerner, 1995; Hall 2004). 
We propose a simple model to analyze the association between technology 
competition and bankruptcy. The model considers two firms competing over a new 
technology in a representative industry, and produces the effects of this competition on 
bankruptcy properties. The implications of the model are consistent with the economic 
intuition obtained from the literature, and prompt three primary hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis posits that the level of a firm’s technology competitiveness predicts its 
likelihood to go bankrupt. The common bankruptcy prediction models rely primarily on 
financial ratios that reflect the current financial status and operating performance of the 
firm. These ratios, however, do not necessarily capture the status of the firm in the 
technology competition, which can be a dominant factor in the survival of the firm, 
especially in industries characterized by intensive technological innovations. 
The second hypothesis addresses the relation between bankruptcy and 
macroeconomic conditions. Economic intuition and the empirical evidence suggest that 
there are fewer bankruptcies in prosperous industries and when the economy is in good 
shape. We argue that this association is weaker for bankruptcies that are driven by 
technology competition. The intuition is as follows. Technological innovations typically 
enhance the economy, and particularly the technology-intensive industries (e.g., Hsu, 
2009; Bena and Garlappi, 2011). Yet, at the same time, these innovations put the firms 
that lose in the innovation competition at a serious disadvantage, which could propel 
them toward bankruptcy (e.g., Solt, 1993; Fogel, Morck, and Yeung, 2008; Garleanu, 
Kogan, and Panageas, 2009). 
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The third hypothesis poses that bankruptcies that are driven by technology 
competition are more costly. This is due to a rapid decline in demand for products of the 
“old technologies”, higher depreciation for obsolescent equipments and inventories, the 
poorer reputation of firms that do not keep up with advances in technology, and the costs 
of potential patent litigation. In other words, while bankrupt firms typically experience a 
gradual deterioration in performance, a firm that loses in the technology competition 
could find itself very quickly without any competitive strength.    
We test these three hypotheses using the detailed patent data of U.S. public firms over 
1976-2005. Patent data are considered the most direct measure of firm-level innovation 
output in the accounting and economics literature (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Pakes, 
1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; Francis and Smith, 1995; Deng, Lev, and 
Narin, 1999; Bastin and Hubner, 2006), and have several advantages for assessing 
technological competitiveness. First, unlike research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, which involve uncertainty and often inefficiency (see, e.g., Jensen, 1993), 
patents are realized technologies affecting future operating performance and are publicly 
traded (see Lev, 2001). Second, patents draw competition because they are proprietary 
and exclusive. Third, as patent competition and litigation have surged in a variety of 
industries, many firms have realized the necessity of defensive patent filings (see, e.g., 
Hall, 2004; Hall and Ziedonis, 2007). Fourth, patents are a powerful tool in hindering 
competitors or creating income from royalties (see, e.g., Lerner, 1995). In fact, many 
major patent-filing firms, such as Texas Instruments Inc. and Intel Corporation, have 
their own litigation teams to monitor their rivals’ technology activities. 
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The empirical evidence supports our hypotheses. We first find that patent competition 
predicts future bankruptcies at three different levels. At the aggregate level, an increase in 
patent activity, especially in technology-intensive industries, leads to more bankruptcies. 
At the industry level, the number of patent issues in a technology-intensive industry is 
positively associated with bankruptcy among the firms in the industry that did not receive 
patents recently. This relation remains significant in the presence of well-used bankruptcy 
predictors, namely Z-score, credit rating, and the KMV measure. At the firm level, we 
propose a two-factor measure of a firm’s technology competitiveness. The first factor 
captures the ability of a firm to create patents, adjusted to its R&D effort; and the second 
factor captures the intensity of the technology competition in the industry the firm 
belongs to. Logit regressions show that both factors significantly predict firm bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, our two-factor model outperforms Z-score, credit rating, and the KMV 
measure in predicting bankruptcy. Technology competition hence explains a substantial 
and distinct part of corporate bankruptcy. These findings strongly support the first 
hypothesis.  
Second, we assess the effect of technology competition on the relation between 
macroeconomic conditions and bankruptcy. At both industry and firm levels, the 
likelihood of bankruptcy as a result of patent competition is less sensitive to the business 
cycle and industry growth, as posited by our second hypothesis. Thus, technological 
innovations, which typically enhance market and industry conditions, also severely 
exacerbate the performance of firms that do not move forward with the changes in 
technology.   
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Third, we examine whether firms that go bankrupt as a result of technology 
competition have higher indirect bankruptcy costs, as measured by the declines in 
accounting earnings and stock prices. Consistent with the third hypothesis, indirect 
bankruptcy costs are significantly higher for technology-related bankruptcies than for 
ordinary bankruptcies, and these costs increase with the intensity of the patent 
competition.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section motivates the 
economic association between technology competition and corporate bankruptcy. Section 
II models the effect of innovation on bankruptcy and states our set of hypotheses. Section 
III describes the data and variable estimation. Section IV tests the hypotheses, and 
Section V concludes. 
 
I. The Role of Technology Competition in Corporate Bankruptcy 
Predicting corporate bankruptcy, or assessing the extent of financial distress, has been 
studied for over four decades. Models to measure the probability of bankruptcy are 
constructed using a variety of techniques. These include multiple discriminant analysis 
(e.g., Altman, 1968; Aziz, Emanuel, and Lawson, 1988); multiple choice analyses, such 
as logit (e.g., Ohlson, 1980; Zavgren, 1985; Shumway, 2001; Campbell, Hilscher, and 
Szilagyi, 2008) and probit (e.g., Zmijewski, 1984); and contingent claim frameworks 
(e.g., Crosbie and Bohn, 2002).  
The measures of bankruptcy risk are based mostly on financial ratios that indicate 
current financial status (e.g., book leverage), profitability (e.g., ROA, profit margin), 
liquidity (e.g., current ratio), efficiency (e.g., asset turnover), growth prospects (e.g., 
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market-to-book ratio), and more. To the best of our knowledge, no measure directly 
incorporates the ongoing technology progress of the firms, and specifically the extent of 
its competence. A poor status of a firm in the technology race might not be reflected in its 
current financial ratios, but could still have a great impact on performance in the 
upcoming years, which could mean quick and costly bankruptcy.  
Technology competition has been recognized as a critical determinant of the industry 
dynamics. Griliches (1984) and Pakes (1985) both show that firms’ R&D expenses and 
patent activities have positive effects on their stock prices. Cuneo and Mairesse (1984) 
and Griliches (1984) show a strong relation between productivity and R&D investment in 
both the U.S. and France. Dierickx and Cool (1989) argue that R&D capability is a 
valuable and sustainable asset in a competitive industry due to the lack of tradability. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) show that new 
technologies are devastating for incapable old firms and obsolete industries in the long 
run. Moreover, the most recent work by Garleanu, Kogan, and Panageas (2009) suggests 
that innovation intensifies product competition and lowers the profits and values of 
existing firms. All these studies indicate that the technological competence of a firm 
affects its likelihood to survive in the long run.  
It is not an overstatement to say that today’s patent system is a major battlefield for 
corporations. Patent competition has become fierce since the establishment of a patent-
specialized court (the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, CAFC) in 1982 and a few 
highly publicized patent infringement cases in the mid-1980s (see Petruzzi, Del Valle, 
and Judlowe, 1988; Hall, 2004). Bessen and Meurer (2005) find escalating patent 
litigations; the annual number of total patent lawsuits doubled from 1984 to 1999. Such a 
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surge of patent competition should not be surprising, as there is a self-reinforcing loop 
between more patent filings and more patent litigations. That is, escalating patent 
competition is an unavoidable consequence as technology advances and patent regulation 
becomes stronger.   
For individual firms, patent competition can sometimes be devastating. A patent 
assignee firm can request a preliminary injunction to forestall infringement that would 
impose legal expenditures and operation costs on its competitors (see Lanjouw and 
Lerner, 2001). Moreover, announcement of patent infringement litigation has a negative 
impact on a defendant’s reputation and stock price (see, e.g., Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 
1994; Lerner, 1995), making it harder for a defendant firm to survive the court order. 
Finally, once a dispute is resolved by the court, litigation costs for the party that loses 
could be very high (see Lerner, 1995; Hall, 2004). As all these costs are driven by 
technology competition, bankruptcies are expected to be more costly in technology-
intensive industries. 
The work of Franzen, Rodgers, and Simin (2007) could be most related to our study 
as they also argue that the traditional measures of financial distress become less accurate 
in recent decades and require adjustments such as including information about 
technology development. Their research, however, is different from our study in many 
aspects. They aim to demonstrate the distortion in accounting-based distress measures 
due to the conservative treatment of R&D expenses, while we propose the causality 
between technology competition and bankruptcy. Their main suggestion is to modify 
Ohlson’s (1980) bankruptcy prediction model by capitalizing R&D expenditures, while 
we present a new prediction model with patent-based factors. 
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Our study is also related to the work of Acharya and Subramanian (2009) and 
Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2010). While we analyze how technological 
innovations lead to bankruptcy, they investigate how legal environment factors including 
bankruptcy laws and labor laws affect firms’ innovation decisions.   
 
II. A Simple Model and Testable Hypotheses 
We consider a standard two-date setup with two firms in a representative industry. At 
date 1 the value of Firm i’s total assets is Ki. The assets are financed by both equity and 
debt with a face value Di that matures at date 2 (for simplicity we assume no taxes and a 
zero coupon rate).2 During the period between dates 1 and 2, both firms compete in a 
technology race; let iA  be an indicator variable that represents the innovation success of 
Firm i. That is, we consider three possible scenarios. In the first scenario Firm 1 
innovates and patents a new technology, and Firm 2 does not innovate, i.e., in this case 
1A = 1 and 2A = 0. The second scenario is the opposite case, i.e., 1A = 0 and 2A = 1. And 
in the third scenario there is no innovation, i.e., 1A = 2A = 0. Since a patent is an 
exclusive right, we do not consider the possibility that 1A = 2A = 1. Let 1P , 2P , and 3P  be 
the probabilities at date 1 of these three scenarios. Since the probability of innovation in 
the industry is given by 21 PP  , and since an innovation benefits one firm and hurts the 
other, 21 PP   measures the level of technology competition in the industry.3  
                                                 
2 We assume that the firm’s leverage is taken as given as our objective is to assess the effect of innovation 
on bankruptcy when the debt is already in place. However, we recognize that the choice of leverage can be 
endogenous to the firm’s innovative investment plans, as suggested by Liu and Wong (2011). 
3 Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) model a general relation between innovation and 
product market competition. Our model however assumes that the competition is exclusively over new 
technologies, as our objective is to analyze the effect of the innovation competition on bankruptcy, where 
individual firms are price takers.  
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The value of Firm i at date 2 can thus be viewed as a sum of two components. The 
first one is the firm’s operating cash flow, designed as:4  
iii KAC )(  ,                     (1) 
where Ci > 0 denotes a scaling parameter, and   denotes the uncertain macroeconomic 
condition that affects both firms’ operating profits, and follows a normal distribution 
),( 2 N . The second component is the residual value of total assets, which is set to 
 iKAA )](1[ 21   ,                (2) 
where 10   . Note that while the firm’s own innovation success positively affects its 
operating cash flows, the aggregate innovation activity has a negative effect on the firm’s 
residual value of physical capital. This is because innovations make dated factories and 
equipments less productive and deteriorate their market value.  
Finally, as Firm i has debt in place, it will go bankrupt if the value of its total assets at 
date 2 is lower than the face value of debt, i.e.,  
iiiii DKAAKAC  ])(1[)( 21 .                      (3) 
In the next subsections we analyze the model implications in terms of prediction 
ability, macroeconomic effects, and bankruptcy costs, and accordingly posit our testable 
hypotheses.  
 
A. Technology Competition and Bankruptcy Predication 
We argue that a firm’s relative position in the technology competition and the 
aggregate- and industry-level technological development can explain future bankruptcy. 
Figure 1 shows the effects of innovation ability and leverage ratio on the probability of 
                                                 
4 This form of operating cash flow is motivated by Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009) and reflects a constant 
return to scale production function with a fixed product price. 
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bankruptcy for a representative firm (Firm 1) assuming the following values: 11 K , 
5.01 C , 5.0 , 1 , 1 , and 5.021  PP , where 1P  varies between 0 and 
0.5, and 1D  varies between 0.5 and 1.
 5 First, the probability to go bankrupt increases 
with the leverage ratio; this result is very intuitive and consistent with the common 
bankruptcy prediction models that use leverage as a major input. Second, and more 
interestingly, the bankruptcy risk significantly increases when the probability of the firm 
to innovate decreases, especially at the high levels of leverage. The implication of this 
result is that the ability of a firm to innovate contains information about its likelihood to 
go bankrupt over that captured by the leverage ratio.  
Figure 2 shows how the level of technology competition affects the probability of 
bankruptcy. We measure technology competition by the probability of aggregate 
innovation, 21 PP  , which varies between 0 and 0.5, where the two firms have the same 
probability to innovate. The remaining parameter values are as in Figure 1. Consistent 
with the intuition discussed above, the figure indicates that more innovation activities in 
the industry could lead to more bankruptcies.  
These results suggest that innovation activities can explain subsequent bankruptcy, 
and lead to three sub-hypotheses at the aggregate, industry, and firm levels.  
H1a:  The increase in total patents reflects more severe technology competition overall, 
which leads to more bankruptcies.  
H1b: The increase in industry patents reflects more severe technology competition within 
the industry, which leads to more bankruptcies among the firms incapable of 
generating patents. 
                                                 
5 The implications of the model are not sensitive to the values of these parameters. 
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H1c:  Individual firms are more likely to go bankrupt if (i) they fall farther behind their 
competitors in patent competition, and (ii) the patent activity in the industry is more 
intense. 
   
B. Technology-Related Bankruptcies and Macroeconomic Conditions 
The conventional wisdom is that there should be more bankruptcies in fading 
industries or in recession years (see, e.g., Denis and Denis, 1995; Vassalou and Xing, 
2004). We predict that bankruptcies that are driven by technology competition are less 
related to macroeconomic conditions. This is due to the duel effect of technology: on the 
one hand, technological innovations enhance the economy and typically lead to industry 
growth, and on the other hand, they significantly aggravate the standing and performance 
of firms that do not develop new technologies.  
Figure 3 shows how the effect of aggregate innovation ( 21 PP  ) on bankruptcy risk 
interacts with the effect of the state of the economy, measured by  , which varies 
between 0.75 and 1.25. We use the same parameter values in Figures 1 and 2, where the 
face value of debt is set to 0.7. As expected, the probability of bankruptcy is inversely 
related to the economy state. And as we argue, the probability of bankruptcy is also 
significantly increasing with the aggregate innovation activity, which could make the 
economy state less dominant in explaining bankruptcy.  
We thus propose two sub-hypotheses positing that the effect of technology 
competition is weakening the effect of business cycle and industry growth on bankruptcy:  
H2a:  Technology-related bankruptcies are less sensitive to the business cycle.  
H2b: Technology-related bankruptcies are less sensitive to the industry growth. 
 
  13
 
C. Costs of Technology-Related Bankruptcies  
The costs of bankruptcy are typically divided into direct costs that are associated with 
the bankruptcy process (e.g., legal, accounting, and other professional fees) and indirect 
costs that arise when a firm is approaching bankruptcy (e.g., loss of reputation, clients, 
suppliers, employees, potential business deals, and partners). We focus on indirect 
bankruptcy costs, which appear to be more significant than direct costs (see, for example, 
Warner, 1977; Altman, 1984; Opler and Titman, 1994) and more related to technology 
competition.  
We argue that indirect bankruptcy costs should be higher in technology-related 
bankruptcies for several reasons: (1) when a new technology is developed by competitors 
and becomes accepted in the market, the firms without the technology could experience a 
significant decline in demand for their products due to the short life cycle of hi-tech 
products; (2) in the presence of new technologies, all inventories and equipments 
associated with the old technologies depreciate very fast; (3) firms that fall behind in the 
technology-based competition could very quickly lose their reputation as strong players 
in the industry; and (4) operations of the defendant in a patent litigation could be shut 
down by court order.  
The proposed model justifies our argument. We measure the indirect bankruptcy costs 
by the reduction in Firm 1’s book value between dates 1 and 2: 
 ]})(1[){( 21 iiiii KAAKACK   .                        (4) 
We define a technology-related bankruptcy as an event where the representative firm 
(Firm 1) goes bankrupt and the competing firm (Firm 2) is innovating (i.e., 1A = 0 
and 2A = 1). And we define an ordinary bankruptcy as an event where Firm 1 goes 
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bankrupt and no firm is innovating (i.e., 021  AA ). Thus, the cost of a technology-
related bankruptcy is  
])1([ iiii KKCK   ,                  (5) 
where ),)1((~])1([ 222   iiiiiiii KCKKCNKKC  . 
This means therefore that the expected bankruptcy cost is given by 
])1(|)1([ iiiiiiii DKKCKKCEK   ,                 (6) 
which, based on the conditional expectation of a normally distributed variable, equals: 
 ]
)(
)()1([
z
zKCKKCEK iiiiii 
 ,             (7) 
where 
ii
iiii
KC
KKCD
z
)1(   , and (.) and (.) are the density and cumulative 
functions of a standard normal distribution.  
Similarly, the cost of an ordinary bankruptcy is  
][ iiii KKCK   ,                   (8) 
where ),(~][ 222   iiiiiii KCKCNKKC  , which implies that the expected bankruptcy 
cost is given by  
]
)(
)([]|[
z
zKCKKCEKDKKCKKCEK iiiiiiiiiiiiii 
 ,            (9)  
where 
ii
iiii
KC
KKCD
z
  .  
Figure 4a compares the costs of technology-related and ordinary bankruptcies for 
different levels of leverage ratio, where 11 K , 5.01 C , 5.0 , 1 , 1 , and 
5.021  PP . The results show first that in both cases the expected bankruptcy cost 
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decreases with a rise in leverage. This relation is intuitive as a firm is likely to lose more 
of its value if it could not pay a lower amount of debt. More importantly, for any level of 
leverage the expected cost of technology-related bankruptcy exceeds that of ordinary 
bankruptcy.  
Because bankruptcy costs can be affected by macroeconomic conditions, we compare 
the costs of the two types of bankruptcies at different levels of the state of the economy, 
measured by   (Figure 4b), and the risk of the economy, measured by   (Figure 4c), 
where the face value of debt is set to 0.7. As expected, bankruptcy costs in general 
decrease when the economy improves and increase when the economy becomes riskier. 
And consistent with Figure 4a, technology-related bankruptcies are more costly than 
ordinary bankruptcies.   
We thus propose two sub-hypotheses: 
H3a: Technology-related bankruptcies incur higher indirect bankruptcy costs.  
H3b: Indirect bankruptcy costs rise with the intensity of the patent competition. 
 
III. Data and Variable Estimation 
 
A. U.S. Patent Data 
We first collect 22,071 company names from the CRSP/Compustat database over the 
period 1976-2005. We then obtain each public firm’s all types of patents (utility, design, 
plant, and reissue) by manually searching their names in the assignee category of the 
Patent Full-Text and Image Database (PatFT), which contains the details of all patent 
applications being approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
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database.6 Each patent is dated by two time placers: application dates and approval dates. 
We thus count each public firm’s annual successful patent applications (patent counts 
dated by application years) and annual patent issues (patent counts dated by approval 
dates). The matching process generates 1,099,434 successful patent applications and 
998,272 patent issues owned by 5,024 public firms over the sample period. It is important 
to note that, unlike previous studies that typically use micro patent datasets (e.g., 
Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; Francis and Smith, 1995; Deng, Lev, and Narin, 
1999), our sample includes all public firms’ patent records. For the firms that changed 
their names or experienced mergers and acquisitions, we match their patents using the 
permanent numbers recorded in the CRSP/Compustat database.  
 
B. Technology-Intensive Industries 
For each 4-digit SIC code industry, we calculate the percentage of firms filing for at 
least one successful patent application in every calendar year. The time series average of 
annual percentages of applications in an industry (denoted Pct Ap) serves as a measure of 
technology competition in that industry. We then define technology-intensive industries 
as industries with a successful patent application rate higher than 25%. The threshold 
ratio approximates the percentage of firms owning patents in the whole CRSP/Compustat 
database (5,024 out of 22,071). We obtain a total of 62 technology-intensive industries, 
listed in Table I. This group of industries seems appropriate to represent an environment 
of technology-driven competition, as it includes most of the highly technological 
                                                 
6 Our sample does not include private firms that do not appear in CRSP/Compusat database. Yet, the data 
selection does not seem to affect the validity of our conclusions, as venture capital-backed start-up 
companies with patenting record typically have significantly lower bankruptcy probability than those 
without patenting record (see Cao and Hsu, 2010). Moreover, using public firms sample is consistent with 
the literature standard and provides a good comparison to previous studies.   
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industries, such as computers, semiconductors, and biological and pharmaceutical 
industries.  
 
C. Bankruptcy Classification 
We use the CRSP delisting file to classify bankrupt firms. Although CRSP has a 
specific code for bankruptcy, we include all the delisting categories associated with poor 
performance such as ‘liquidation’ and ‘dropping due to bad performances’ in the 
bankruptcy group, because they relate to technology competition in the same way as 
bankruptcy does.   
 
D. Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
We use three measures of bankruptcy risk that represent different methodologies as 
control variables in our tests. The first one is Altman’s (1968) Z-score, a widely used 
model of bankruptcy prediction.7 The second is S&P bond credit rating, provided by 
Compustat, where a higher value indicates higher default risk. The third, known as the 
KMV approach, is built on Merton’s (1974) default model (see Ronn and Verma, 1986; 
Crosbie and Bohn, 2002; Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004; Leland, 2004).8 
                                                 
7 Altman’s Z-score model for predicting bankruptcies is: Z-score=1.2(Working capital/Total 
assets)+1.4(Retained earnings/Total assets)+3.3(Earnings before interest and taxes/Total 
assets)+0.6(Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities)+0.999(Sales/Total assets). 
8The KMV measure of default risk is estimated using a two-equation system. The first expresses the value 
of the firm’s equity as the value of a call option on the firm’s total asset using the Black and Scholes (1973) 
formula: ),()( 21 dNFedNVV rTAE  where EV  is the firm’s equity value, measured by the stock price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding; )(N  is the cumulative function of a standard normal 
distribution; ]/[])2/()/[ln( 21 TTrFVd AAA  , Tdd A 12 ; F  is the face value of debt, measured 
by the book value of total liabilities of the firm; r  is the risk-free rate, measured by the one-year Treasury 
bill yield; T  is the time to maturity of debt, measured by the weighted-average maturity of the short- and 
long-term debt; and AV  and A  are the unobservable market value and volatility of the firm’s total assets. 
The second equation, a straightforward derivation of Ito’s lemma, represents the relation between equity 
volatility, E , measured by the realized monthly stock return volatility in the subsequent year, and asset 
volatility: EAAE VdNV /])([ 1   . As there are no closed-form solutions to AV  and A , we solve the two 
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All the inputs required to calculate the three measures are taken from the 
CRSP/Compustat database. 
  
E. Descriptive Statistics 
Table II reports descriptive statistics of the important variables for technology-
intensive industries and other industries. The technology-intensive industries represent 
30.4% of the market capitalization of all listed industrial companies, indicating that these 
industries account for a substantial part of the overall economy. Firms in technology-
intensive industries are usually larger, have lower leverage ratios and higher market-to-
book ratios, and invest more in R&D.9 These differences are expected, as technology-
intensive firms are usually capital-intensive with more growth opportunities. Another 
interesting result is that the average firms operating in technology-intensive industries 
appear to experience less financial distress than average firms in other industries, as 
indicated by all three measures of bankruptcy risk. 
  
IV. Empirical Tests 
A. Hypothesis 1a 
Hypothesis 1a concerns the effect of total patents on bankruptcy frequency. We test it 
using the time series regression: 
ttt,t InterestPatents#freqBankruptcy 2103    
         ttt cessionReDefault   43 ,                                     (10) 
                                                                                                                                                 
equations simultaneously using initial values of FVE  and E . The probability of bankruptcy is defined as 
the probability that the face value of debt exceeds the asset value at maturity, and is given by )2(1 dN , 
which is equivalent to the probability of not exercising a European call option.  
9 Size is measured by the market value of equity, calculated by the stock price times the number of shares 
outstanding; market-to-book ratio is equity market value divided by equity book value; leverage is the book 
value of debt divided by the book value of total assets; and R&D investment is measured as a fraction of 
the book value of total assets. 
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where ‘bankruptcy freq’ denotes the percentage of firms that went bankrupt during the 
next three years; and ‘# patents’ is the total patent issues of all firms in the sample over 
the past one or three years. To eliminate marketwide effects on bankruptcy frequency, the 
regression also includes three variables that represent the state of the economy: the 
interest rate, measured by the nominal return on 1-month Treasury bills; the default 
spread, which is the yield spread between long-term Baa- and Aaa-rated securities (taken 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s website); and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) recession indicator. To control for a positive time trend in 
patent activity, we also consider the annual change in number of patents as the dependent 
variable. Figure 5 provides a first indication for a positive effect of change in patent 
activity on the likelihood of bankruptcy in technology-intensive industries. 
The regression results are reported in Table III, where the Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors are used to correct for serial correlation. The upper box in Panel A shows 
regressions for patent issues in the past year. We find first that when the sample is 
confined to technology-intensive industries, the number of patents significantly predicts 
bankruptcy frequency. As a single explanatory factor, the number of patents in the past 
year explains 31.2% of the variation in bankruptcy frequency with a p-value of 0.007. 
The effect of total patents remain significant when we control for marketwide variables 
(p-value of 0.037), indicating that the results are not driven by business cycle conditions.  
Second, expanding the sample to all firms in all industries shows a similar but 
somewhat weaker effect. The p-values of total patents are 0.118 and 0.204, with an 
explanatory power of over 10% of future bankruptcy frequency. The less significant 
results are expected, as patents should play a more influential role in technology-
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intensive industries. The lower box in Panel A shows similar, albeit weaker, results when 
we use total patents in the past three years as the explanatory variable. Examination of the 
effect of the change in patent activity on future bankruptcy frequency (reported in Panel 
B) shows even stronger results, where the p-values range between 0.000 and 0.037.  
Overall, Table III prompts the observation that more intense patent activity leads to 
more bankruptcies. These findings strongly support hypothesis 1a, and are consistent 
with the argument of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) 
that new technologies reshape industry organization by forcing incapable older firms and 
obsolete industries out of business. 
 
B. Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b addresses the industry-specific relation between patents and 
bankruptcies in technology-intensive industries. To test it we run the pooled regression: 
t,it,i)t,t(,i ZMeanPatents#freqBankruptcy 2103    
 t,it,it,i KMVMeanRating.Spec   43 ,                               (11) 
 
where ‘bankruptcy freq’ is the number of firms in industry i that did not issue patents in 
the past one or three years and went bankrupt during the next three years, divided by the 
number of firms that did not issue patents in the past one or three years; and ‘# patents’ is 
the number of patents issued in the industry over the past one or three years. To examine 
whether the patent activity incorporates information relevant for future bankruptcy that is 
not captured by common bankruptcy predictors, we include in the regression the 
following variables: the mean Z-score, the proportion of firms with speculative-grade 
bonds (ratings of BB+ or lower), and the mean KMV measure.  
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Panel A of Table IV shows industrywide regression results for patents issued in the 
past year. All regressions strongly indicate that patent activity increases the bankruptcy 
risk of the firms that do not issue patents. As a single explanatory variable, the coefficient 
of industry patent issues has a p-value of 0.000, and it is barely affected when we add 
each of the three bankruptcy predictors. When we include all bankruptcy predictors in the 
regression, the coefficient of industry patent issues remains significant (p-value of 0.048), 
and it increases the R-square from 7.5% to 8.6%.   
Panel B of Table IV shows very similar results for industry patent issues over the past 
three years, indicating a robust effect of industry patent activity on bankruptcy that is not 
captured by current financial status or operating performance in technology-intensive 
industries. Table IV therefore supports hypothesis 1b, implying that we should expect 
more incapable firms to be driven out of business in a rapidly evolving industry. For 
instance, the rise and fall of an internet company would occur faster than that of a lumber 
company because the technologies used in traditional industries usually develop more 
slowly.  
   
C. Hypothesis 1c 
We test hypothesis 1c concerning the association between a firm’s position in the 
technology competition and its likelihood to go bankrupt using a logit regression: 
tititti PIIndRDPTFirmindicatorBankruptcy ,2,10)3,(, .#    
 t,it,it,it,i KMVratingCreditscoreZ   543 ,                     (12)                               
 
 where ‘bankruptcy indicator’ is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i went bankrupt 
in the following three years, and zero otherwise. The independent variables include two 
patent-based factors. The first factor (Firm PT-RD) measures the firm’s relative strength 
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in the industry patent competition. The term PT is the number of the firm’s patent issues 
in the past one or three years, divided by the total number of patents issues in the 
industry. For example, if one firm owns most patents in its industry, it dominates the 
industry in technology and is thus less likely to experience financial distress. Note that 
we use patent issues, not patent applications, because only approved patents can be used 
to secure properties and attack competitors. While PT focuses on the ultimate result in 
terms of relative number of patents, it does not take into account the cost of innovation. A 
firm might not have generated many patents recently but still be able to compete 
successfully in its industry because its R&D cost is relatively low (see, e.g., Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989). Similarly, a firm may strategically postpone its innovation efforts at certain 
times (e.g., for reorganization purposes), so both its R&D expenses and the number of 
patent issues are low, but its status in the competition remains strong. We thus subtract 
from PT the term RD, which is the firm’s average R&D expenditures in the past three 
years scaled by its equity market value.10 
The second factor in regression (12), Ind. PI, measures the intensity of the technology 
competition in the industry. It is defined by the total number of successful patent 
applications in the industry in the year, divided by the industry size (the sum of equity 
market values of all firms in the industry). As discussed above, firms in fast-growing, 
highly technological industries confront harsher technology competition, and are more 
likely to go bankrupt because of fierce market competition and potentially fatal patent 
litigations. The regression also includes the three bankruptcy predictors: Z-score; a credit 
rating dummy variable that equals one if the rating is BB+ or lower (speculative-grade), 
and zero otherwise (investment-grade); and the KMV measure. 
                                                 
10 The results are robust when using Firm PT only. 
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To control for industry and time effects on the likelihood of a firm to go bankrupt, we 
examine the results using fixed effects regressions for each 2-digit SIC code and year in 
the sample. And as this regression (and others below) relies on firm-level data, the 
standard errors are clustered by individual firms.11  
  The results reported in Table V indicate that both the firm’s technology competence 
and the industry technology intensity explain its likelihood to go bankrupt. The p-values 
are extremely low when only the two patent-based factors are included in the regression, 
and remain very low in the presence of each bankruptcy predictor. That is, consistent 
with our earlier findings, patents provide additional information over common 
bankruptcy prediction measures.  
We recognize that the results in Table V may be affected by potential endogeneity, 
assuming that there are unobserved firms-specific characteristics that influence a firm’s 
patent activity and bankruptcy risk. To address the endogeneity concern, we employ the 
following two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage we run a linear regression of 
the firm’s relative strength in the industry patent competition (Firm PT-RD) on two 
instrumental variables (IVs) that are associated with the firm’s patent activity and not 
with its likelihood to go bankrupt. The first IV is patent owning percentage, which 
denotes the fraction of all public firms in every 2-digit SIC industry that have at least one 
patent registered in the USPTO over the past five years. The second IV is R&D cost per 
patent, defined as the total five-year R&D expenditures in every 2-digit SIC industry 
divided by the number of patents in that industry over the past five years. These two IVs 
measure the incentive of firms to file patents in each industry, and hence should be 
closely related to their patent activities. Yet, they should not affect the individual firm’s 
                                                 
11 Using the Newey-West (1987) procedure for panel data yields similar results. 
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bankruptcy risk as they are unrelated to its financial situation. We verify the validity of 
the two IVs (unreported). The first stage regression thus generates the predicted Firm PT-
RD. 
 In the second stage we run a probit regression, where the dependent variable is the 
bankruptcy dummy (equals one if the firm went bankrupt in the following three years, 
and zero otherwise) and the independent variables include the predicted Firm PT-RD, 
Ind. PI, Z-score, credit rating dummy, KMV measure, industry dummies, and year 
dummies. The results of the second stage probit regressions reported in Table VI are 
consistent with the results in Table V. The predicted Firm PT-RD has a significant effect 
on its likelihood to go bankrupt (the p-values remain extremely low). Our empirical tests 
thus suggest that the proposed innovation-bankruptcy relation cannot be attributed to 
endogeneity. 
We also recognize a potential reverse causality relation, given that firms facing 
financial difficulties might under-invest in research and patent activity and are also more 
likely to go bankrupt in the future (e.g., Li, 2010). To control for the reverse causality 
effect, we include lagged Z-score, credit rating, and the KMV measure, in the predictive 
models of Tables V and VI (unreported). That is, adding these lagged variables controls 
for the possible effect of the extent of financial distress in prior years on current patent 
activity, and thus on bankruptcy risk. We find that Firm PT-RD remains significant in 
forecasting future bankruptcy. This suggests that the relative strength in the patent 
competition has a distinct explanatory power for bankruptcy, which is not captured by 
prior financial difficulties.   
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Figure 6 visualizes the findings of Table V to provide an assessment of the economic 
significance of the proposed patent-based bankruptcy predictors. The first column 
(sample frequency) denotes the unconditional probability of bankruptcy (6.78%). A one-
standard deviation change in Firm PT-RD and Ind. PI increases the bankruptcy 
probability to 9.25% and 7.94%, respectively. When both factors change by one standard 
deviation, the conditional bankruptcy probability surges to 10.81%, which is higher than 
the effects produced by each of the three bankruptcy predictors. Note that the 4 
percentage points  increase in bankruptcy probability created by Firm PT-RD and Ind. PI 
is about the difference in the default rates of firms with Aaa-rated and B-rated bonds 
according to Moody’s (see Hamilton, 2004), which provides another indication for the 
economic importance of the results.  
The empirical evidence overall supports all three testable sub-hypotheses, suggesting 
that intense patent competition increases a firm’s possibility of bankruptcy. Moreover, 
technology competition explains a distinct part of firm bankruptcy that is not captured by 
traditional models such as Z-score, credit rating, and the KMV measure. 
 
D. Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
Panel A of Table VII reports the results for hypothesis 2a, which addresses the effect 
of technology competition on the relation between bankruptcy and business cycle. At the 
industry level, we regress subsequent (one- and three-year) bankruptcy frequency in each 
industry on the NBER recession indicator (RC) and on an interactive term between RC 
and technology competition. We use two proxies defined earlier in Section III.B to 
measure industry technology competition. The first one, PDI, is a dummy variable that 
equals one for technology-intensive industries (i.e., all 4-digit SIC industries in which at 
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least 25% of the firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table I), and zero 
otherwise. The second one, Pct Ap, is the time series average of the annual percentages of 
the firms with successful patent applications in an industry, representing the intensity of 
the patent competition in that industry. 
First, as expected, the effect of business cycle on bankruptcies is statistically 
significant in all regressions, validating the notion that more bankruptcies occur after 
recessions. Second, and more important, the coefficients of the interaction terms, 
RC*PDI and RC*Pct Ap, are both significantly negative (p-values between 0.000 and 
0.058), implying that bankruptcy frequency in technology-intensive industries is less 
sensitive to the business cycle.   
We also examine the hypothesis at the firm level using a logit regression. The 
dependent dummy variable equals one if the firm went bankrupt in the following one or 
three years, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the same as in the 
industry-level regressions: a business cycle dummy and an interaction term between the 
business cycle and the industry technology competition proxies. For the PDI proxy, the 
results are consistent with the industry-level tests, as the coefficients of the business cycle 
dummy and the interaction term remain positive and negative, respectively. For the Pct 
Ap measure is used, however, the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant.  
We conduct a similar analysis to test hypothesis 2b on the effect of technology 
competition on the relation between bankruptcy and industry growth (Panel B of Table 
VII). We run an industry-level linear regression of subsequent bankruptcy frequency in 
an industry on the industry growth (IG, measured by the annual percentage change in the 
total revenues in the industry minus the annual percentage change in the total revenues in 
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all industries) and on an interaction term between IG and the same proxies of industry 
technology competition as in Panel A (PDI and Pct Ap).  
As expected, the coefficients of industry growth are significantly negative, indicating 
that bankruptcies are less likely to occur in prosperous industries. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, the coefficients of the interaction terms are all positive, although not 
significant for Pct Ap, suggesting that technology-related bankruptcies are less correlated 
with the industry success.    
The results are even stronger for the firm-level logit regression, where we regress a 
bankruptcy dummy variable on the corresponding industry growth and the interaction 
term. As in industry-level regressions, the coefficients of industry growth and the 
interaction term are significantly negative and positive, respectively.  
The results in Table VII support our proposition that bankruptcies that are driven by 
technology competition are less affected by macroeconomic conditions, and, even in a 
promising industry, the possibility of failure of a firm could be high if technology 
competition is fierce in that particular industry. 
 
E. Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
We test hypothesis 3a using a simple comparison of indirect bankruptcy costs of 
technology-related bankruptcies and ordinary bankruptcies. Technology-related 
bankruptcies include all firms that went bankrupt without issuing any patent during the 
three years prior to bankruptcy in technology-intensive industries. The record shows a 
total of 279 technology-related bankruptcies over 1976-2005.  
We use two measures of indirect bankruptcy costs. The first is the sum of abnormal 
earnings in the three years prior to bankruptcy (scaled by asset book value), following 
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Altman’s (1984) method.12 The second one is the cumulative stock return in the three 
years prior to bankruptcy. One advantage of using stock return is that it allows a much 
bigger sample than abnormal earnings does, because the latter requires data on the 
previous ten years. Both measures are used in both raw and industry-adjusted data 
(calculated by subtracting the industrywide medians of the measures from the firm’s raw 
figures).  
Table VIII presents the means and medians of the indirect bankruptcy cost measures 
for technology-intensive industries and other industries, as well as the p-value of the 
differences (T-test for means and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for medians). The first 
row in the table shows that technology-related bankrupt firms suffer a greater decline in 
earnings when approaching bankruptcy. The mean drop in earnings for ordinary 
bankruptcies is 17.2%, compared to 28.1% for technology-related bankruptcies (although 
the p-value of the difference is 0.178), and the median reduction is 16.2%, compared to 
25.6% (p-value of 0.069). Similar results are found when we account for industry effects 
(second row in the table).   
  The stock return comparison is consistent with the earnings differences. The third 
row in the table shows that technology-related bankruptcies lose 49.9% of stock price on 
average, while ordinary bankruptcies lose 43.1% (p-value of 0.089). In terms of median, 
technology-related bankruptcies lose 76.4% of stock price, while ordinary bankruptcies 
lose 71.4% (p-value of 0.028). The industry-adjusted data show even stronger results, as 
                                                 
12 We first run a regression of the firm’s annual sales on the aggregate sales in the industry in each of the 
past ten years. This regression’s coefficients yield the firm’s estimated sales for the current year. The firm’s 
estimated profit (net income) for the current year is then given by multiplying the firm’s estimated sales by 
its average profit margin in the past ten years. The firm’s abnormal earning in each year is therefore the 
difference between the firm’s actual and estimated profits. Finally, the firm’s indirect costs are defined as 
the sum of its abnormal earnings in the three years prior to bankruptcy, scaled by the book value of total 
assets. 
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the p-values of all differences are very low. The comparisons in Table VIII thus 
unanimously indicate that technology-related bankrupt firms suffer higher costs. 
To test whether indirect bankruptcy costs increase with the intensity of the technology 
competition (hypothesis 3b), we regress the cost measures in Table VIII (abnormal 
earnings and stock returns) on industry technology competition measured with Pct Ap. 
The regression also includes firm size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage, as these may 
affect the magnitude of bankruptcy costs in particular, and earnings and stock returns in 
general.  
The regressions in Panel A of Table IX indicate that technology competition reduces 
earnings, especially when raw data are used (p-values of 0.084 and 0.082). And similarly, 
the regressions in Panel B indicate a very strong negative effect of technology 
competition on stock return, where all p-values are no higher than 0.001. The lower p-
values in the stock return tests could be attributed to the larger sample size than the size 
for the abnormal earnings tests.  
Table IX corroborates the findings reported in Table VIII, and further suggests that 
technology competition is a distinct factor in explaining indirect bankruptcy costs. The 
results in both tables therefore support our prediction that firms confront higher indirect 
bankruptcy costs when they operate in an environment characterized by intense 
technology competition.   
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the association between technology competition and corporate 
bankruptcy. Firms operating in technology-driven industries could find themselves very 
quickly in trouble with a real risk of failure, if they do not keep pace with the recent 
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innovations. Moreover, the nature of highly technological industries could impose high 
costs on firms that lose in the competition, due to reduced or inefficient productivity, a 
rapid decline in demand, out-of-date equipment, shrinking market share, and various 
costs of potential patent litigations. Another distinctive characteristic of bankruptcies that 
are driven by technology competition is their relatively weak relation to macroeconomic 
conditions. This is because the technological innovations that typically enhance the 
economy also force some less capable firms into bankruptcy.  
Analysis of firm-level patent data yields empirical evidence to support our 
hypotheses. Severe technology competition leads to a higher frequency of bankruptcy, 
and firms that perform poorly in technology competition are more likely to go bankrupt. 
Moreover, the ability of technology competition to predict future bankruptcy remains 
significant in the presence of common bankruptcy predictors, such as Z-score and credit 
rating, and even outperforms their predictive ability in technology-intensive industries. In 
addition, bankruptcies that are driven by technology competition are less sensitive to the 
business cycle and the industry growth, and result in greater declines in earnings and 
stock prices than ordinary bankruptcies. The findings in this study therefore suggest an 
important role of technology competition in corporate bankruptcy. 
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Figure 1. Effects of Firm 1’s Innovation Ability and Leverage on its Bankruptcy 
Risk 
 The figure shows the probability of Firm 1 to go bankrupt, }])(1[){( 21 iiiii DKAAKACP   ,  
for different values of its probability to innovate, 1P , and its leverage, 1D . The remaining parameter 
values are set to: 11 K , 5.01 C , 5.0 , 1 , 1 , and 5.021  PP .   
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Figure 2. Effects of Aggregate Innovation and Leverage on Firm 1’s Bankruptcy 
Risk 
The figure shows the probability of Firm 1 to go bankrupt, }])(1[){( 21 iiiii DKAAKACP   ,  
for different values of the probability of aggregate innovation, 21 PP  (where the two firms have the 
same probability to innovate), and its leverage, 1D . The remaining parameter values are set to: 11 K , 
5.01 C , 5.0 , 1 , and 1 .     
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Figure 3. Effects of Aggregate Innovation and Economy State on Firm 1’s 
Bankruptcy Risk 
The figure shows the probability of Firm 1 to go bankrupt, }])(1[){( 21 iiiii DKAAKACP   ,  
for different values of the probability of aggregate innovation, 21 PP  (where the two firms have the 
same probability to innovate), and the expected state of the economy,  . The remaining parameter 
values are set to: 11 K , 11 D , 5.01 C , 5.0 , and  1 .  
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Figure 4. Technology-Related and Ordinary Bankruptcy Costs 
The figure displays the expected costs of technology-related and ordinary bankruptcies as defined in 
Section II.C. The parameter values used are 11 K , 7.01 D , 5.01 C , 5.0 , 1 , 1 , and 
5.021  PP , where Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, show the bankruptcy costs when 1D ,  , and  vary.  
      Figures 4a   
       Figure 4b   
       Figure 4c   
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Figure 5. Time Series Relation between the Change in Number of Patents and 
Future Bankruptcy Frequency in Technology-Intensive Industries 
The change in total number of patents is the difference between the number of patents issued in the 
current and previous years in technology-intensive industries (all 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 
25% of the firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table I). Bankruptcy frequency is the 
number of firms in technology-intensive industries that went bankrupt during the next three years, 
divided by the total number of firms in these industries.   
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Figure 6. Predictive Effects of Patent-Based and Other Measures on the 
Probability of Bankruptcy in Technology-Intensive Industries 
The sample contains firms in technology-intensive industries (all 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 
25% of the firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table I) over the period 1976-2005. The 
results are based on the logit regressions appearing in Table V:   XindicatorBankruptcy ' , 
where X is a set of bankruptcy predictors. The model’s probability of bankruptcy is 
)1/()( '
ˆˆ'ˆˆ xx eeBP    , and the economic effect of each predictor is defined by the change in P(B) 
as a result of one standard deviation change in the predictor value from its mean. The bankruptcy 
predictors (as described in Table V) are: the patent-based measures, Firm PT-RD and Ind. PI (appear 
jointly in the regression), Z-score, credit rating, and KMV (appear separately in the regressions). The 
changes in P(B) of all predictors are compared to the unconditional probability of bankruptcy, measured 
by the bankruptcy frequency in the sample.   
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Table I. Technology-Intensive Industries 
The list of 62 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 25% of the firms file successful 
patent applications during a calendar year over 1976-2005. 
Industry % patent applications 
Aircraft & Parts  93.75% 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment (No Computer Equip) 76.74% 
Computer & office Equipment  65.32% 
Primary Production of Aluminum  59.70% 
Motor Vehicles & Passenger Car Bodies 53.73% 
Chemicals & Allied Products  52.51% 
Papers & Allied Products  48.62% 
Plastic Material, Synth Resin/Rubber, Cellulos (No Glass) 48.52% 
Guided Missiles & Space Vehicles & Parts 45.70% 
Electronic Connectors  45.67% 
Semiconductors & Related Devices  45.16% 
Heating Equip, Except Elec & Warm Air; & Plumbing Fixtures 44.57% 
Aircraft  44.53% 
Miscellaneous Chemical Products  43.77% 
Office Machines, NEC  42.22% 
Farm Machinery & Equipment  40.47% 
Office Furniture  40.40% 
Miscellaneous Products of Petroleum & Coal 39.33% 
Lawn & Garden Tractors & Home Lawn & Gardens Equip 38.89% 
Plastic Materials, Synth Resins & Nonvulcan Elastomers 36.95% 
Auto Controls For Regulating Residential & Comml Environments 36.45% 
Construction Machinery & Equip  35.93% 
Rubber & Plastics Footwear  35.14% 
Soap, Detergents, Cleaning Preparations, Perfumes, Cosmetics 34.78% 
Surgical & Medical Instruments & Apparatus 34.05% 
Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers, Enamels & Allied Prods 33.44% 
Metalworkg Machinery & Equipment 33.41% 
Aircraft Parts & Auxiliary Equipment, NEC 33.33% 
Computer Storage Devices  33.20% 
Motorcycles, Bicycles & Parts  32.81% 
Special Industry Machinery, NEC  32.55% 
Power, Distribution & Specialty Transformers 32.37% 
Paper Mills  32.13% 
Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories  32.10% 
Laboratory Analytical Instruments  32.08% 
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical Sys 31.98% 
Beverages  31.87% 
Household Audio & Video Equipment 31.84% 
Greeting Cards  31.34% 
Metal Cans  31.29% 
Dolls & Stuffed Toys  30.77% 
Food and Kindred Products  30.03% 
Switchgear & Switchboard Apparatus 29.53% 
Electronic Computers  29.33% 
Engines & Turbines  28.90% 
General Industrial Machinery & Equipment, NEC 28.65% 
Household Appliances  28.07% 
Industrial Process Furnaces & Ovens 28.04% 
Public Bldg & Related Furniture  27.70% 
Biological Products (No Diagnostic Substances) 27.65% 
Grain Mill Products  27.44% 
General Industrial Machinery & Equipment 27.43% 
Pharmaceutical Preparations  26.90% 
Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC 26.84% 
Electric Housewares & Fans  26.59% 
Paperboard Mills  26.55% 
Electromedical & Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 25.67% 
Instruments For Meas & Testing of Electricity & Elec Signals 25.58% 
Air‐Cond & Warm Air Heatg Equip & Comm & Indl Refrig Equip 25.46% 
Pumps & Pumping Equipment  25.35% 
Oil & Gas Field Machinery & Equipment 25.28% 
Electronic Components & Accessories 25.00% 
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Table II. Descriptive Statistics of Technology-Intensive Industries and Other 
Industries 
Technology-intensive industries include the 4-digit SIC industries in which the average percentage of firms 
filing successful patent applications during a calendar year is at least 25% (as listed in Table I). Other 
industries include the remaining 4-digit SIC codes. For all variables, observations outside the top and the 
bottom percentiles are excluded. The firm-specific variables are: size (in millions of dollars) is measured by 
the market value of equity, calculated by the stock price times the number of shares outstanding; market-to-
book ratio is equity market value divided by equity book value; book leverage is the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of total assets; R&D investment is measured as a fraction of the book value of 
total assets; Z-score is based on Altman’s (1968) model for predicting bankruptcy; credit rating is the S&P 
senior debt rating, taken from Compustat; and the KMV measure follows the Merton-based approach 
developed by Crosbie and Bohn (2002) for measuring default risk. The results are calculated over 1976-
2005. 
Technology-intensive industries Other industries 
(% market cap = 30.4) (% market cap = 69.6) 
Mean Median StdD Mean Median StdD 
# patent applications per firm in a year 15.25 0.00 59.65 1.87 0.00 21.24 
# patent issues per firm in a year 14.23 0.00 57.33 1.75 0.00 20.82 
% firms apply for patents in a year 32.95 0.00 47.00 7.17 0.00 25.79 
% firms issue patents in a year 31.16 0.00 46.32 6.65 0.00 24.91 
Size 1,731.67 101.02 9,503.16 974.13 63.16 7,585.40 
Market-to-book  2.88 1.91 2.99 2.32 1.51 2.55 
Book leverage 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.21 
R&D investment  0.10 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.08 
Z-score 4.33 3.46 3.64 3.70 3.07 3.19 
Credit rating 10.88 11.00 4.09 12.26 12.00 4.02 
KMV measure 0.11 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.21 
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Table III. Time Series Regressions of Future Bankruptcy Frequency on Patent 
Issues in Technology-Intensive Industries and in the Entire Market 
 The results are presented for a sample of technology-intensive industries, which are all 4-digit SIC 
industries in which at least 25% of the firms file successful patent applications (as listed in Table I), and for 
a sample of all industries. In Panel A the dependent is bankruptcy frequency, calculated by the number of 
firms that went bankrupt during the next three years in technology-intensive industries only (and in all 
industries), divided by the total number of firms in technology-intensive industries only (and in all 
industries). The primary independent variable is the total number of patents (in thousands) issued in the 
past one year and in the past three years. The control variables are the interest rate, measured by the 
nominal return on 1-month Treasury bills; the default spread, estimated by the yield spread between long-
term Baa- and Aaa-rated securities; and the NBER recession dummy variable. Panel B shows similar 
regressions where the independent variable is the annual change in number of patents. The table shows 
regression coefficients and p-values, based on Newey-West standard errors, for a sample of 30 years over 
1976-2005.  
Panel A: Total number of patents 
   Patent issues in the past year Intercept # patents Interest Default Recession R-square 
Tech. intensive Coefficient 0.01825 0.00349 0.312
industries P-value (0.336) (0.007)
0.00715 0.00429 0.45151 -2.63192 0.00987 0.314
(0.879) (0.037) (0.259) (0.264) (0.674) 
All industries Coefficient 0.03693 0.00249 0.113
P-value (0.292) (0.118)
0.03803 0.00307 0.59870 -4.69405 0.01192 0.127
(0.617) (0.204) (0.318) (0.184) (0.733) 
   Patent issues in the past 3 years Intercept # patents Interest Default Recession R-square 
Tech. intensive Coefficient 0.04625 0.00049 0.167
industries P-value (0.002) (0.068)
0.08341 0.00026 0.06016 -2.88226 0.01935 0.192
(0.050) (0.569) (0.889) (0.217) (0.401) 
All industries Coefficient 0.07178 0.00029 0.031
P-value (0.004) (0.321)
0.12312 0.00012 0.17774 -4.59797 0.02003 0.076
(0.054) (0.809) (0.774) (0.180) (0.549) 
Panel B: Change in number of patents 
   Patent issues in the past year Intercept ∆ # patents Interest Default Recession R-square 
Tech. intensive Coefficient 0.06312 0.01115 0.187
industries P-value (0.336) (0.012)
0.09074 0.01045 -0.08354 -2.34366 0.02798 0.384
(0.879) (0.015) (0.690) (0.206) (0.029) 
All industries Coefficient 0.08654 0.00942 0.165
P-value (0.000) (0.015)
0.11954 0.00836 0.09210 -3.72838 0.02333 0.285
(0.000) (0.037) (0.781) (0.213) (0.229) 
   Patent issues in the past 3 years Intercept ∆ # patents Interest Default Recession R-square 
Tech. intensive Coefficient 0.05576 0.00574 0.488
industries P-value (0.000) (0.000)
0.07844 0.00496 0.27293 -3.56675 0.02017 0.647
(0.000) (0.007) (0.183) (0.003) (0.052) 
All industries Coefficient 0.07700 0.00533 0.462
P-value (0.000) (0.000)
0.09591 0.00536 0.60705 -5.19626 0.01398 0.635
(0.000) (0.001) (0.038) (0.006) (0.362) 
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Table IV. Industrywide Regressions of Future Bankruptcy Frequency on Patent 
Issues in Technology-Intensive Industries 
The sample contains all 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 25% of the firms file successful patent 
applications (as listed in Table I). In Panel A the dependent variable is the number of firms in the industry 
that have not issued patents in the past year and went bankrupt during the next three years, divided by the 
number of firms that have not issued patents in the past year. The primary independent variable is the 
number of patents (in thousands) issued in the industry in the past year; as the number of patents has very 
large outliers, observations with more than 100 patents were set to 100. The control variables are the mean 
Z-score, the proportion of firms with speculative-grade bonds (rating of BB+ or lower), and the mean KMV 
measure, all among the firms in the industry that have not issued patents in the past year. Panel B shows 
similar results where patents are considered in the past three years. The table shows regression coefficients 
and p-values, based on Newey-West standard errors modified for panel data, for a sample of industry-years 
over 1976-2005.  
Panel A: Patent issues in the past year 
Bankruptcy freq Intercept # patents Mean Z Spec. rating Mean KMV # Obs R-square 
Coefficient 0.05760 0.22350 1,812 0.018
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
0.06279 0.23202 -0.00306 1,822 0.026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
0.05920 0.14102 0.03262 747 0.024
(0.000) (0.012) (0.007)
0.04228 0.23641 0.13518 1,344 0.045
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.06683 -0.00351 0.01834 0.25039 474 0.075 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.197) (0.000)
0.05341 0.15944 -0.00389 0.01684 0.22832 474 0.086
(0.000) (0.048) (0.004) (0.226) (0.000)
Panel B: Patent issues in the past 3 years 
Bankruptcy freq Intercept # patents Mean Z Spec. rating Mean KMV # Obs R-square 
Coefficient 0.04279 0.22625 1,722 0.014
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
0.04972 0.22940 -0.00359 1,722 0.028
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.03869 0.17732 0.04454 657 0.034
(0.002) (0.034) (0.001)
0.02659 0.24538 0.13991 1,233 0.041
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
0.04969 -0.00250 0.03590 0.24949 422 0.083 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.023) (0.000)
0.02243 0.20423 -0.00273 0.03303 0.23487 422 0.095
(0.171) (0.077) (0.010) (0.044) (0.000)
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Table V. Firm-Specific Logit Regressions of the Likelihood of Bankruptcy on the 
Firm’s Relative Innovative Strength and the Industry’s Patent Competition in 
Technology-Intensive Industries 
The sample contains firms in technology-intensive industries (all 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 
25% of the firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table I). In Panel A the dependent variable 
(bankruptcy indicator) equals one if the firm went bankrupt during the next three years, and zero otherwise. 
The primary independent variables are: (i) Firm PT-RD, which is the ratio of the number of patents issued 
by the firm in the past year to the total number of patents issued in the industry in the past year minus the 
ratio the firm’s average R&D expenditures in the past three years to its equity market value; and (ii) Ind. PI, 
which is the total number of patent applications in the industry in the year divided by the industry size (the 
sum of equity market values of all firms in the industry). The control variables are the firm’s Z-score; a 
credit rating dummy variable that equals one if the rating is BB+ or lower (speculative grade), and zero 
otherwise (investment grade); the KMV measure (as described in Table III); and industry dummies and 
year dummies to control for fixed effects. Panel B shows similar regressions where patents are considered 
in the past three years. The table shows logit regression coefficients and p-values, based on standard errors 
clustered by individual firms, for a sample of firm-years over the period 1976-2005.   
Panel A: Patent issues in the past year 
Intercept Firm PT-RD Ind. PI Z-score Credit rating KMV # Obs 
Coefficient -4.39508 -0.92881 2.95071 30,390
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-4.48984 -0.87529 2.90271 -0.00823 30,390
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-4.27075 -1.31390 4.94382 2.10372 4,463
(0.000) (0.001) (0.061) (0.000)
-2.18577 -0.94304 3.38382 2.12480 10,250
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Patent issues in the past 3 years 
Intercept Firm PT-RD Ind. PI Z-score Credit rating KMV # Obs 
Coefficient -3.27245 -0.81128 2.79539 27,184
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-3.46008 -0.73690 2.73957 -0.00928 27,184
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-2.33830 -1.46495 4.86993 2.16623 4,370
(0.035) (0.001) (0.075) (0.000)
-1.91989 -0.70738 2.92281 2.37499 9,066
(0.013) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
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Table VI. Two-Stage Firm-Specific Probit Regressions of the Likelihood of 
Bankruptcy on the Firm’s Relative Innovative Strength and the Industry’s Patent 
Competition in Technology-Intensive Industries 
The sample contains firms in technology-intensive industries (all 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 
25% of the firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table I). The table shows the results of a 
second-stage probit regression of the following two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage we run a 
linear regression of Firm PT-RD (the ratio of the number of patents issued by the firm in the past year to 
the total number of patents issued in the industry in the past year minus the ratio the firm’s average R&D 
expenditures in the past three years to its equity market value) on two instrumental variables: the 
percentage of all public firms in a specific industry that have a patent record over the past five years, and 
the average R&D cost of each patent in a specific industry over the past five years. This regression 
generates the predicted Firm PT-RD. In the second stage we run a probit regression, where the dependent 
variable is the bankruptcy dummy (equals one if the firm went bankrupt in the following three years, and 
zero otherwise) and the primary independent variables are the predicted Firm PT-RD (P_Firm PT-RD), and 
Ind. PI, which is the total number of patent applications in the industry in the year divided by the industry 
size. The control variables are the firm’s Z-score; a credit rating dummy variable that equals one if the 
rating is BB+ or lower (speculative grade), and zero otherwise (investment grade); the KMV measure (as 
described in Table III), industry dummies and year dummies. Panels A and B present the results where 
patents are considered in the past year and three years, respectively. The table shows coefficients and p-
values, based on standard errors clustered by individual firms, for a sample of firm-years over the period 
1976-2005.   
Panel A: Patent issues in the past year 
Intercept P_Firm PT-RD Ind. PI Z-score Credit rating KMV # Obs 
Coefficient -3.10468 -1.85595 1.12292 30,390
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-3.10095 -1.86429 1.08449 -0.00315 30,390
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-2.00639 -2.31889 0.45102 0.20456 4,463
(0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.044)
-0.72182 -2.28292 0.39295 0.24416 10,250
(0.031) (0.000) (0.052) (0.043) 
Panel B: Patent issues in the past 3 years 
Intercept P_Firm PT-RD Ind. PI Z-score Credit rating KMV # Obs 
Coefficient 0.37473 -2.38133 0.43386 27,184
P-value (0.205) (0.000) (0.004)
0.26429 -2.38111 0.37815 -0.00134 27,184
(0.379) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008)
-0.01444 -2.46759 0.40944 0.19753 4,370
(0.943) (0.000) (0.104) (0.048)
0.41813 -2.39408 0.28597 0.23070 9,066
(0.109) (0.000) (0.045) (0.028) 
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Table VII. The Effects of Business Cycle and Industry Growth on Bankruptcy in 
Technology-Intensive Industries 
The upper box in Panel A shows industry-year linear regressions. The dependent variable is the bankruptcy 
frequency in the industry (# of bankruptcies/# firms) in both the current year and the next three years. The 
independent variables are: RC is the NBER recession dummy variable; PDI is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the industry is technology-intensive (all 4-digit SIC industries in which at least 25% of the 
firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table I), and zero otherwise; and Pct Ap is the average 
percentage of firms in the industry that file successful patent applications during a calendar year. The lower 
box in Panel A shows firm-year logit regressions. The dependent dummy variable equals one if the firm 
went bankrupt, in both the current year and the next three years, and the independent variables are as in the 
upper box. Panel B shows similar regressions to Panel A, where replacing the recession dummy variable 
with the industry growth (IG), defined as the annual percentage change in the total revenues in the industry 
minus the annual percentage change in the total revenues in all industries. The table shows regression 
coefficients and p-values for a sample of all industries over 1976-2005. The standard errors are clustered by 
industries for industry-level regressions and by individual firms for firm-level regressions. 
Panel A: Business cycle
Industry-level linear regression (# Obs=12,707)
Bank_freq in the current year Intercept RC RC*PDI Intercept RC RC*Pct Ap
Coefficient 0.02522 0.00978 -0.01079 0.02522 0.01066 -0.02372
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.058)
Bank_freq in the next 3 years 
Coefficient 0.09047 0.01038 -0.03215 0.09047 0.01372 -0.07780
P-value (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002)
Firm-level logit regression (# Obs=190,507)
Bankruptcy in the current year Intercept RC RC*PDI Intercept RC RC*Pct Ap
Coefficient -3.76902 0.44970 -0.26764 -3.76902 0.41196 0.00294
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.991)
Bankruptcy in the next 3 years 
Coefficient -2.38202 0.09806 -0.14742 -2.38202 0.07668 -0.00427
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.013) (0.983)
Panel B: Industry growth
Industry-level linear regression (# Obs=12,295)
Bank_freq in the current year Intercept IG IG*PDI Intercept IG IG*Pct Ap
Coefficient 0.02588 -0.02138 0.01874 0.02589 -0.02175 0.02715
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.315)
Bank_freq in the next 3 years 
Coefficient 0.08811 -0.02893 0.03514 0.08807 -0.02690 0.01476
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.003) (0.799)
Firm-level logit regression (# Obs=188,178)
Bankruptcy in the current year Intercept IG IG*PDI Intercept IG IG*Pct Ap
Coefficient -3.69000 -0.75450 0.74598 -3.68822 -0.81599 1.70774
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Bankruptcy in the next 3 years 
Coefficient -2.38590 -0.22667 0.28190 -2.38509 -0.27992 1.06909
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
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Table VIII. Indirect Bankruptcy Costs in Technology-Intensive Industries 
The table compares indirect bankruptcy costs of technology-related and ordinary bankruptcies. 
Technology-related bankruptcies contain all bankrupt firms in the technology-intensive industries  (the 4-
digit SIC industries in which at least 25% of the firms file successful patent applications, as listed in Table 
I) that did not issue patents in the three years prior to the bankruptcy, while during that period other firms in 
the industry issued patents. We use two measures of bankruptcy costs: the abnormal earnings during the 
three years prior to bankruptcy scaled by asset book value, based on Altman’s (1984) method; and the 
cumulative stock return in the three years prior to bankruptcy. The table presents the means and medians of 
the two measures, at both raw data (the actual bankruptcy costs), and industry adjusted data, which is the 
difference between the actual cost and the industry median; and the two-sided p-values of the difference 
between the means (T-test) and the medians (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) over 1976-2005.  
  
Technology-related 
bankruptcies 
Ordinary 
bankruptcies P-value of difference 
  # Obs Mean Median # Obs Mean Median Means Medians 
Abnormal earnings      Raw data 57 -0.281 -0.256 481 -0.172 -0.162 (0.178) (0.069) 
    Ind. adjusted 57 -0.236 -0.189 486 -0.124 -0.098 (0.141) (0.067) 
Stock return     Raw data 279 -0.499 -0.764 2,755 -0.431 -0.714 (0.089) (0.028) 
    Ind. adjusted 278 -0.572 -0.627 2,757 -0.444 -0.472 (0.003) (0.000) 
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Table IX. Regressions of Indirect Bankruptcy Costs on Industry Patent Competition 
The sample contains all firms that went bankrupt and did not issue patents during the three years prior to 
bankruptcy. In panel A the dependent variable is the abnormal earnings during the three years prior to 
bankruptcy scaled by asset book value, based on Altman’s (1984) method; and in Panel B the dependent 
variable is the cumulative stock return in the three years prior to bankruptcy. Earnings and returns appear at 
both raw data (the actual bankruptcy costs) and industry adjusted data, which is the difference between the 
actual cost and the industry median. The main independent variable, Pct Ap, is the average percentage of 
firms in the industry that file successful patent applications during a calendar year. The control variable are: 
size is the log of the market value of equity, calculated by the stock price times the number of shares 
outstanding; market-to-book ratio is equity market value divided by equity book value; and leverage is the 
book value of debt divided by the book value of assets; all measured as of three years prior to bankruptcy. 
The table shows regression coefficients and p-values, based on standard errors clustered by individual 
firms, computed over 1976-2005. 
Panel A: Abnormal earnings 
Raw data Intercept Pct Ap Size Market-to-book Leverage # Obs R-square 
Coefficient -0.14862 -0.25616 455 0.008
P-value (0.000) (0.084) 
-0.07187 -0.25499 -0.01334 -0.00593 0.20361 455 0.042
(0.349) (0.082) (0.054) (0.544) (0.004)
Ind. adjusted 
Coefficient -0.11576 -0.18377 455 0.005
P-value (0.000) (0.156) 
-0.09099 -0.17878 -0.00693 -0.00202 0.14849 455 0.024
(0.209) (0.174) (0.293) (0.851) (0.012)
Panel B: Stock return 
Raw data Intercept Pct Ap Size Market-to-book Leverage # Obs R-square 
Coefficient -0.35846 -0.59777 2,861 0.007
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
0.45942 -0.48812 -0.06697 -0.05107 -0.11405 2,861 0.077
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041)
Ind. adjusted 
Coefficient -0.37189 -0.46721 2,828 0.005
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
0.14565 -0.42313 -0.04156 -0.02589 -0.15606 2,828 0.033
(0.102) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
